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Abstract
Social Security Disability Insurance beneficiaries undergo periodic medical reviews to
determine if they continue to be eligible for disability benefits. We examine how
these reviews affect beneficiary well-being by using administrative data to track the
earnings of beneficiaries for up to 5 years after their reviews. We estimate that a
sizeable percentage of beneficiaries would work if their benefits were ceased in a
medical review. However, many appear to be unable to maintain employment: only
one in three would have earnings over the full follow-up period. Further, far fewer
would reach any of several measures of earnings sufficiency.
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1 Introduction
In recent decades, spending on Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) worker bene-
fits has increased due to an increase in the number of awards coupled with the length
of time beneficiaries remain on the rolls.1 This increase in program costs has led to
calls for stronger program oversight including tighter controls on program entry (see
Morton 2015 for a review of various proposals) and helping current beneficiaries re-
turn to work (e.g., Social Security Advisory Board 2009; DeHaven 2013). One way to
address this issue is to increase the number of post-award medical reviews that the So-
cial Security Administration (SSA) conducts to determine whether beneficiaries remain
eligible for the program. Whether SSA should increase the number of medical reviews
depends on factors such as the potential program savings, the cause of the increase in
the number of benefit awards in recent years, and the economic outcomes for
beneficiaries removed from the rolls as a result of a medical review. We focus on
the last point by examining the earnings of former beneficiaries, which we inter-
pret as a plausible upper bound on the potential earnings that beneficiaries who
remain eligible for the program could attain if their eligibility were hypothetically
to cease.
In conducting medical reviews, SSA identifies some beneficiaries as no longer eli-
gible, thereby saving the cost of future benefits that would have been paid to those in-
dividuals. Medical reviews can be very expensive; but even during the government
sequestration in 2013, the president’s budget called for an increase in program integ-
rity, including the number of post-award medical reviews conducted by SSA to ensure
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beneficiaries remain eligible for the program. SSA estimated that for each $1 spent on
these reviews approximately $13.2 in net Federal lifetime benefits (including Old Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance, Supplemental Security Income, Medicare, and
Medicaid) were saved in FY 2011 (SSA 2013a), though there are different returns on in-
vestment by type of disability program (Stephens, 2014). The high average return sug-
gests that SSA could conduct more reviews and save more in lifetime benefits,
although these savings would outweigh the costs only up to a certain point.
Many have suggested that the increase in the number of beneficiaries is driven by the
attractiveness of the disability programs relative to the job opportunities for workers
with disabilities (e.g., Autor and Duggan 2006) and an increase in the number of appli-
cants with harder-to-establish conditions such as musculoskeletal and mental impair-
ments (e.g., Burkhauser and Daly 2011, 2012). However, others suggest that this
increase is primarily a byproduct of an aging population and other demographic
changes, such as the increasing proportion of women working and gaining insured sta-
tus for DI (Goss, 2013). Identifying the cause of this increase is important and may
have implications for any increase in the frequency or number of medical reviews. For
instance, a higher proportion of beneficiaries with less easily verifiable conditions
means that increased reviews will, in addition to removing beneficiaries who are no
longer medically eligible, inevitably remove some who should remain eligible due to in-
herent uncertainties associated with their condition.
The effectiveness of conducting medical reviews depends in part on the fraction of
beneficiaries on the rolls with the ability to work at a substantial level. The idea that
many of the people receiving disability benefits would be gainfully employed in the ab-
sence of these programs has a long, if controversial, history. Parsons (1980), for ex-
ample, argued that the reduction in labor force participation of working-age males was
“largely explained by the increased generosity of social welfare transfers, particularly
Social Security disability payments” (p. 130), and Black, Daniel, and Sanders (2002),
Autor and Duggan (2003), and others have made similar points. Bound (1989), on the
other hand, argued that an upper bound on the percent of older men receiving DI
benefits in the 1970s who would work in the absence of DI was less than 50 %.
Although not without detractors (notably Parsons 1991), Bound’s conclusions have been
validated for a variety of other populations and years (see, for example, Chen and van der
Klaaw 2008 and von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2011). The increase in the propor-
tion of younger applicants, and a higher likelihood of work among younger rejected appli-
cants, has contributed to a gradual increase in Bound’s estimated upper limit on
employment among DI beneficiaries (von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2011). Other
recent studies have used instrumental variables to predict the employment impacts of DI
(see Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2013) and French and Song (2014), for example). These
studies are similar in concept to the Bound approach but support a more causal interpret-
ation and find somewhat larger impacts on employment than Bound.
While informative about the effect of the disability program on labor supply and
earnings of the population, most studies have not typically provided information on the
potential loss of benefits on the existing beneficiary population. This difference is subtle
but important. Current beneficiaries are even more likely than applicants to suffer from
human capital depreciation and weakened social and employment networks, resulting
in larger barriers to employment. Brucker (2015), for example, found that individuals
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with disabilities in the labor force had higher levels of social capital than those with dis-
abilities not in the labor force. Individuals removed from DI have been out of the labor
force for several years and would thus be expected to have lower levels of social capital.
Nichols et al. (2013), however, review the consequences of long-term unemployment,
many of which would be expected to be relevant for individuals receiving DI and amp-
lified by the presence of a disability, and find little evidence to explain exactly how
these consequences lead to worse outcomes. If current beneficiaries are substantially
less employable than applicants, the employment impacts of ceasing beneficiaries from
the program may be smaller than those of tightening front-end eligibility.
There has been some research on DI beneficiaries who medically recover (e.g.,
Dykacz 1998; Hennessey and Dykacz 1993; Dykacz and Hennessey 1989; Treitel 1979;
Schmulowitz 1973), but these studies do not look at the subsequent earnings. Moore
(2014) analyzed SSA’s elimination of drug abuse and alcoholism as a qualifying disabil-
ity in the mid-1990s and found a large employment effect just after the termination of
individuals with these diagnoses, but the effect declined over time. Moore’s findings re-
sult from a unique change in policy—removing a specific disability category—and may
not reflect the general population of disability beneficiaries.
Internationally, there is mixed evidence that tightening disability program eligibility
rules impacts labor supply. Staubli (2011), for example, found that tightening the eligibility
for Austria’s disability insurance program increased employment. Conversely, Karlström,
Palme, and Svensson (2008) found that a disability insurance rule change in Sweden had
little impact on employment but did increase the use of other social services. Similarly,
Borghans, Gielen, and Luttmer (2014) find that when benefits were decreased in the
Netherlands, individuals often turned to other social services. However, they also found
that many long-term disability recipients were capable of work at substantial levels.2
In this paper, we extend Bound’s approach and examine the subsequent earnings of
beneficiaries who undergo a medical review, comparing outcomes between those who
remain eligible for disability benefits and those who do not, which we refer to as the
exit margin. Whereas Bound (and subsequent researchers) used the earnings of denied
applicants as the upper limit on the potential lost earnings and employment of allowed
DI applicants, we use the earnings of beneficiaries whose program eligibility ceases be-
cause of a medical review as an upper limit on the potential earnings of beneficiaries
who continue on the program. SSA refers to these medical reviews as continuing dis-
ability review (CDRs), and we describe individuals as “ceased” if SSA determines in a
CDR that they are no longer eligible for disability benefits.
Although ceased individuals do not meet the medical standards for DI, it does not
follow that they are able to earn at a level that would enable them to be self-sufficient
for a sustained period. Indeed, the annual earnings in 2014 considered to qualify as
substantial gainful activity (SGA) are only $1170 more than the 2014 poverty guideline
for an individual over 12 months. An open question is whether individuals who lose eli-
gibility for disability benefits are able to earn enough to avoid poverty. We provide
some evidence of their earning capacity by comparing their post-cessation earnings
with their pre-eligibility earnings and with measures of their potential benefit, the fed-
eral minimum wage, the SGA level, and the individual poverty guideline.
In brief, we find that the majority of ceased DI workers have earnings after program
exit. For obvious reasons, individuals who remain eligible for benefits are less likely
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to seek employment than they would if they were ceased; for that group, we
estimate an upper bound for the likelihood of having earnings of about 43 percentage
points if they were ceased. Average earnings are generally low, only $13,000. Additionally,
while over half of ceased DI workers earn above the SGA level or the individual poverty
threshold in at least one of the 5 years after program exit, only about 20 % consistently
earn over SGA or the poverty threshold in all post-program years.
2 SSA disability policy
For an adult to be eligible for DI, he or she must be unable to engage in SGA by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that is expected to result
in death or to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. Factors such as age,
education, the ability to do prior work, and the ability to perform other jobs in the na-
tional economy can also be considered when determining whether a person has a dis-
ability that qualifies for the program.
To be insured for DI benefits, an individual must have a sufficient and recent work
history, measured in quarters of coverage or work credits, in a covered job to meet eli-
gibility requirements. Each year, the level of earnings required for one quarter of cover-
age changes; in 2016, it was $1260. An individual can earn up to four quarters of
coverage per year. Although the number of quarters required for eligibility varies by
age at disability onset, an individual generally needs a minimum of six quarters of
coverage plus an additional quarter for each year after attaining age 22, with a max-
imum requirement of 40 quarters of coverage. For those over the age of 30 at disability
onset, individuals must have earned at least 20 quarters of coverage during the 10 years
prior to onset.3
SSA also operates the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, for which DI
beneficiaries may also be eligible.4 While the adult eligibility criteria for the SSI pro-
gram include the same definition of disability as the DI program, there is no work his-
tory requirement, but individuals can have no more than $2000 in resources (or $3000
for couples, if both members are eligible.) Additionally, there are residency, citizenship,
and other requirements for SSI. Eligible individuals receive the Federal benefit rate
($721 in 2014) plus any state supplements, less any countable income. Unearned in-
come, such as DI benefits, reduces SSI payments dollar for dollar after an initial disre-
gard of the first $20 of unearned income.
DI beneficiaries can earn any amount of money during a rolling 9-month trial work
period every 60 months. If they earn more than SGA after the trial work period, they
enter a 36-month extended period of eligibility during which they may receive benefits
for each month they do not work above SGA. If they have earnings above SGA at the
end of this period, their eligibility is terminated but can be reinstated expeditiously dur-
ing the following 5 years. Beneficiaries can also take advantage of many work incentives
designed to minimize the impact of returning to work on benefits.
2.1 The medical CDR process5
Despite SSA’s work incentives and return-to-work programs, DI is designed for those
with disabilities that substantially limit the ability to work. To ensure that only eligible
individuals remain on the program, SSA reviews several hundred thousand cases each
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year looking for medical improvement since the last favorable eligibility determination
(i.e., the initial allowance for first-time CDRs or the most recent CDR continuation for
subsequent CDRs). Medical CDRs are mandated by law, though SSA has some discre-
tion in how to administer them. The date for a CDR, known as a diary date, is set at
the time benefits are awarded, and a new diary date is set at each subsequent favorable
decision. These diary dates range from 6 months to 7 years, depending on the likeli-
hood of medical improvement.
Each year, SSA uses a profiling model controlling for various demographic and
programmatic characteristics to determine whether to send a case through the full
medical review (FMR) process (known as a “direct release”) or to mail the benefi-
ciary a questionnaire asking for more information (known as a “mailer”). The
model generates a score for each beneficiary, with higher scores corresponding to a
greater likelihood of medical improvement. Cases with high scores that are due (or
overdue) for a review are typically sent directly through the FMR process whereas
corresponding medium and low-scoring cases receive the mailer questionnaire first.
Beneficiaries who receive mailers are asked to provide SSA with more information
about their current medical status and their ability to work. Cases with mailer re-
sponses that show an indication of medical improvement are in turn sent through
the FMR process. If there is no indication of medical improvement in the re-
sponses, the beneficiary continues on the program, and a new diary date is set for
the next review.
For mailer responses indicating an FMR is necessary, as well as for those directly re-
leased for an FMR, the state Disability Determination Services (DDS) gathers relevant
information to make a determination. If there is sufficient evidence of medical im-
provement since the last favorable decision, the beneficiary receives a cessation deci-
sion. This decision can be appealed to several levels—a reconsideration at the DDS, an
administrative law judge (ALJ) review, an Appeals Council review, and ultimately a re-
view in the Federal courts. If there is insufficient evidence of medical improvement
since the last favorable decision, the beneficiary continues on the program and a new
CDR diary date is set.6
2.2 CDR workload
The number of CDRs that SSA is able to perform in a given year is driven in part by
the amount budgeted for CDR processing and the staff qualified to process them. Be-
tween 1998 and 2008, annual funding for all centrally initiated SSI and DI CDRs ranged
from about $300 million to almost $800 million measured in 2012 dollars (Fig. 1). Con-
gress has occasionally designated funding explicitly for CDRs. For example, the Con-
tract with America Advancement Act and the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act provided dedicated funding from 1996 through 2002 to
meet new CDR and age-18 redetermination requirements included in those acts. This
funding enabled SSA to reduce the backlog and become current with medical CDRs
(i.e., conduct all scheduled CDRs) by the end of FY 2002 (SSA 2013a). Funding for con-
ducting medical CDRs declined substantially from FY 2002 levels over FYs 2003 to
2007. CDR backlogs rebounded to about 1.3 million in FY 2011 (SSA 2013a) due to this
reduction in funding, although funding has increased slightly since FY 2007, measured
in 2012 dollars.
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3 Data sources
SSA’s CDR Waterfall file contains information on centrally initiated FMRs which re-
ceived a DDS determination. We focus on individuals in the DI program who had an
FMR from calendar years 1998 through 2008. Among other information, the Waterfall
file includes date of birth, gender, date of program eligibility, the primary diagnosis
prior to the FMR, diary type (medical improvement expected (MIE), possible (MIP), or
not expected (MINE)),7 whether the individual received a mailer prior to the FMR, the
CDR profile score, dates of the initial and final FMR decisions, and the final outcome
of the FMR (continued or ceased) after all appeals.
We merged the Waterfall file with SSA’s Numident file to obtain dates of death and with
the Master Beneficiary Record (SSA’s main records for the DI program) to replace missing
dates of birth. We also used SSA’s Disability Research File to determine whether an indi-
vidual returns to either DI or SSI after cessation. Data for individuals who died during the
study period are included in our analyses for as long as they were alive.8
Additionally, we merged the data with the Summary Earnings Record (SER) to in-
clude earnings subject to the Social Security tax.9 At the time the data was drawn, the
SER was complete through 2012, providing at least 4 years of follow-up for almost all
target population members. For several of our analyses, we examine mean earnings for
up to 5 years before program eligibility and up to 5 years after the FMR. For example,
to measure mean earnings after the final FMR determination, we took the average earn-
ings during the 5 years after the year of the final FMR—for an individual whose final
decision was in 2003, this includes earnings in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008. We
chose 5 years because that allows for most individuals who return to work to re-
establish themselves in the work force.10 For cohorts with fewer than 5 years after the
Fig. 1 Total number of CDRs, FMRs, and CDR funding by fiscal year, 1998–2008. Source: Annual Report of
Continuing Disability Reviews (CDR) (1998-2008). Note: CDR=Continuing Disability Review; FMR=Full Medical
Review. CDR Funding is adjusted to 2012 dollars using the CPI and measures funding for all CDRs. CDRs
and FMRs shown in the figure only include centrally-initiated reviews (this excludes CDRs initiated for
reasons other than the maturing of a medical review diary or administrative closures which were initiated
as periodic CDRs but were not completed due to technical reasons) of DI beneficiaries and SSI recipients.
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final FMR, we use the mean earnings for all years through 2012—for an individual
whose final decision was in 2008, we take the mean of earnings in 2009, 2010, 2011,
and 2012. We also looked at shorter measures of earnings, including earnings in each
year after the FMR, and the results are qualitatively similar. We adjust all earnings
measures by the Consumer Price Index-All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) to 2012
dollars.11
3.1 Hypotheses and outcome measures
Similar to Bound’s (1989) study of denied applicants, our results on the earnings of
those who had their payments ceased due to an FMR may be interpreted as an upper
limit to the potential earnings of those who remain on the program after an FMR if
their eligibility had instead ceased. Theoretically, those who have their payments ceased
are in better health and are therefore less likely to experience barriers in the labor mar-
ket compared to those who continue to be medically eligible for the program. Hence,
we can think of these estimated earnings as an upper bound of what we could expect if
SSA mechanically increased the number of FMRs, within a particular CDR group, using
the same selection criteria. While these individuals no longer meet the definition of dis-
ability used for SSA program eligibility, they likely continue to have barriers to employ-
ment, such as health deterioration, skill decay, and diminished social and employment
networks.12 Increasing the number of FMRs would likely result in DI beneficiaries with
more severe disabilities receiving those FMRs; these individuals would likely have
greater labor market barriers than our target population and thus earn less.
We operationalize this hypothesis with the following regression, estimated by ordin-
ary least squares:
Y i ¼ αþ β  Ceasedi þ
XJ
j¼1γ j  Xij þ εi; ð1Þ
where Yi is an outcome of interest, the set of which is described below; Ceasedi is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual was ceased and 0 if continued; Xij is a set
of J covariates13; ei is an error term; and a, b, and gj are parameters to be estimated.
Our outcomes of interest include whether an individual has earnings, the level of
earnings, and comparisons to key earnings thresholds chosen to provide objective
points of reference. For these additional earnings thresholds, we use 5-year averages to
summarize the effect of the FMR cessation. While masking any potential differences in
the impact from year to year, this formulation adds the convenience of providing a sin-
gle estimate of the impact of the FMR for these outcomes. Supplemental data analyses
(e.g., using various time measures of earnings—1 year, 2 years, etc.) indicated this loss
of information is not a substantial issue. We present the predicted outcomes from
Eq. (1) for all our results. These results are similar to unadjusted outcomes, which
are available upon request.
The first comparison to an earnings threshold is whether post-FMR earnings are
greater than pre-eligibility earnings, to determine whether individuals return to work at
their prior level of earnings (as measured by their average earnings 5 years before
eligibility). While we expect a decline in earnings in the few years before eligibility due
to disability or job loss, we use 5-year earnings averages to mitigate this effect. The sec-
ond threshold is the maximum potential benefit the individual could have received
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from SSA had he or she remained on the program and not returned to work.14 We do
not use actual payments made to individuals while receiving benefits because it is not
clear that the last payment or an average of recent payments would reflect the pay-
ments available to individuals had they remained on DI; any use of SSA’s work incen-
tives or other sources of income in SSA’s records may be temporary.
We also measure whether post-FMR earnings are greater than the poverty threshold
for a single person, an annualized equivalent of SGA (i.e., 12 times the monthly SGA),
and the annualized equivalent of working full-time at the federal minimum wage level
(assuming 2080 h a year). These last three measures provide comparative earning
thresholds that are independent of the individual. Note that for the potential benefit,
poverty threshold, SGA, and minimum wage comparisons, we use nominal dollar
values each year.15 We do not project these values past the years available at the time
of writing; as with the earnings values, they are defined as missing after 2012. Estimates
include years with $0 earnings. It is important to keep in mind that all our earnings
measures only serve as proxies for an individual’s well-being and do not measure family
supports, other government transfers, or other sources of income and support for
which the individual may be eligible or have access to.
Recent research by Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2013) used an instrumental vari-
ables approach to estimate a causal effect of the DI program on employment. They
point out (along with Parsons 1991 and others) that Bound’s approach could understate
the potential employment effect if the application process itself (particularly the appeals
process) is a factor in the reduction of an applicant’s work capacity. Our study is also
subject to this possibility; however, there are two reasons it may not be as strong an ob-
jection to the methodology on the exit margin presented here. First, we are primarily
interested in a substantially smaller policy counterfactual. Whereas Bound, Parsons,
and others have generally been interested in the role of DI on the reduction in male
employment writ large, we are instead interested in the potential impact of an increase
in the number of CDRs SSA conducts. As a result, we assume the current structure of
the CDR selection process will by and large stay the same, with only marginal adjust-
ments to the selected population—including a full appeals process to which beneficiar-
ies will be eligible. A second, related factor mitigating this methodological concern is
that our follow-up period is measured from the time of the final FMR decision, when
beneficiaries no longer have a reason to hold down their earnings in the anticipation of
eventual program receipt. Thus, this criticism is likely of much less importance to the
exit margin we examine.
4 The target population: selection and characteristics
The target population in this paper comprises adult DI worker beneficiaries who under-
went an FMR between 1998 and 2008. It is important to note that this specific popula-
tion is not representative of the entire CDR population in any given year or the
population of current DI beneficiaries at any given point. Only 21.5 % of DI workers se-
lected for a CDR undergo an FMR (SSA 2013a). We include concurrent beneficiaries
(i.e., beneficiaries who receive both DI and SSI) in our analyses.
We exclude beneficiaries who (1) are missing a final decision date or profile score; (2)
have inconsistent dates (such as a date of eligibility prior to a date of birth); (3) died be-
fore receiving the final decision; (4) have appealed a cessation decision and are awaiting
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a new decision or still have time to appeal their cessation; (5) received a final decision
after 2009; or (6) are in one of three age groups: under age 18 at the time of the initial
decision, age 60 or older at the time of the initial decision, or age 62 or older at the
time of the final decision. We also exclude (7) FMRs that are not the first FMR for
members of our sample. Restrictions (5) and (6) ensure that we have only adults and
adequate follow-up time, to avoid issues with early retirement.16 We impose restriction
(7) to avoid overlap between two FMRs. These exclusions lead to a target population of
2,124,835 DI workers with each person only appearing at most once.
4.1 DI worker beneficiary characteristics
In Table 1, we present selected characteristics of ceased and continued DI workers who
had an FMR between the calendar years of 1998 and 2008. Compared to the full DI
worker population in 2008 (not shown), our sample is more likely to be in their 30s








Total 100.0 2,124,835 100.0 100.0 5.7
Age at initial FMR decision
18 to 30 5.6 119,920 5.2 13.2 13.4
30 to 39 22.4 475,571 21.8 32.7 8.4
40 to 49 41.3 878,587 41.5 39.4 5.5
50 to 59 30.6 650,757 31.6 14.7 2.8
Primary diagnosis
Infectious and parasitic diseases 0.6 13,505 0.6 0.5 4.3
Neoplasms 2.7 56,511 2.3 8.2 17.6
Endocrine, nutritional, and metabolic diseases 4.3 92,185 4.4 2.7 3.5
Blood and blood-forming organs diseases 0.4 7844 0.3 0.8 12.1
Other mental disorders 29.0 615,212 28.9 30.6 6.0
Schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders 7.9 167,896 7.9 7.8 5.6
Intellectual disabilities 3.8 80,547 3.8 3.0 4.5
Nervous system and sense organs diseases 8.5 181,598 8.7 6.0 4.0
Circulatory system diseases 5.9 126,250 6.0 4.5 4.3
Respiratory system diseases 1.7 36,363 1.7 1.6 5.3
Digestive system diseases 2.1 45,286 2.1 3.5 9.5
Genitourinary system diseases 1.7 37,164 1.6 3.9 12.9
Skin and subcutaneous tissue diseases 0.4 7505 0.4 0.4 6.5
Musculoskeletal system and connective tissue diseases 19.7 418,955 20.0 14.4 4.2
Congenital anomalies 0.2 4267 0.2 0.1 3.8
Other 6.4 136,807 6.3 9.2 8.2
Injuries 0.1 2887 0.1 0.1 6.1
Unknown 4.4 94,053 4.5 2.8 3.6
N 2,124,835 2,003,363 121,472
Source: Authors’ calculations using Social Security administrative records
Note: FMR full medical review. See text for full descriptions of the sample
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and 40s and less likely to be in their 50s. Our sample also has a higher proportion of
individuals with mental impairments other than intellectual disabilities, endocrine, nu-
tritional, and metabolic diseases, other and unknown diagnoses, and a smaller propor-
tion of individuals with circulatory system diseases compared to all DI workers in 2008
(SSA 2009).
The final cessation rate, accounting for all appeals through the time of data extrac-
tion, is 5.7 % for DI workers, although this rate varies greatly within some characteristic
groups. We find notably higher cessation rates among younger beneficiaries in our
population. For example, DI workers age 18 to 30 have a 13 % cessation rate compared
to less than 3 % for workers age 50 to 59. This can also be seen in the age distribution
of the continued and ceased groups, where the ceased group has a much larger propor-
tion of younger DI workers than the continued group. Some of the largest differences
in cessation rates occur within primary diagnosis categories. We see relatively high ces-
sation rates for those with neoplasms (18 %), and diseases of the genitourinary system
(13 %), and low cessation rates in the congenital anomalies and endocrine, nutritional,
and metabolic systems diseases categories (less than 4 %). There may be substantial dif-
ferences in the employment outcomes by these groups. Prior research has shown that
the employment and earnings of beneficiaries vary greatly by impairment type
(Mann et al. 2015). Additionally, there may be large differences within impairment
groups, as younger beneficiaries have been shown to have better employment outcomes
in general (Ben-Shalom and Mamun 2015). However, we do not hypothesize who will
be more or less able to return to their prior field of employment or benefit more from
existing support structures.
DI workers who received a mailer prior to their FMR have a lower cessation rate than
to those who were directly released (Table 2). As would be expected, the ceased group
has a higher proportion of MIE diary types, who SSA deemed more likely to medically
improve at the time of their last favorable decision. Beneficiaries with high profile
scores have a final cessation rate more than twice the rate for low- and medium-
scoring beneficiaries. There is no distinguishable pattern in cessation rates across FMR
years for our population, other than slightly higher rates in the later years when fewer
FMRs were conducted, a finding we return to later in the paper.
5 Estimates of cessation impact on earnings outcomes
Consistent with the program’s focus on replacing lost wages due to disability, earnings
fall steeply in the year just before eligibility (Fig. 2). While those who continue to re-
ceive benefits after the FMR expectedly have low mean earnings, those who are ceased
typically do not return to their pre-DI earnings levels. On average, former DI workers
only reach about 70 % of their pre-DI earnings levels—dropping from about $19,000 in
the 5 years before eligibility to about $13,000 in the 5 years after the FMR (Table 3).
Controlling for other characteristics, we estimate that, in the 5 years after the FMR,
former beneficiaries earn roughly $11,000 more (per year) than those continued on the
program (Table 3). Almost 70 % of ceased beneficiaries have earnings during the 5 years
after the FMR, compared to about a quarter of continued beneficiaries. All else equal,
ceased beneficiaries are about 45 percentage points more likely than their continued
peers to have earnings above SGA, the poverty level, or the full-time minimum wage in
the 5 years after the FMR (over a predicted base rate of about 6–7 % for those
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continued). The estimated upper bound on the impact of a cessation on earnings above
their potential benefit is also 45 percentage points; the impact on work activity above
their pre-eligibility earnings is about 38 percentage points, all else equal.
Even though about half of ceased beneficiaries earned above the various earnings
thresholds, few are able to maintain that level for all of the follow-up period. For ex-
ample, only 37 % had earnings in all follow-up years, and only 20 % were able to main-
tain earnings above the annualized SGA level or the poverty threshold in the 5 years
after program exit.
The aggregate statistics presented above mask the differential outcomes across a
very heterogeneous target population. To provide context about how specific
groups of ceased beneficiaries and recipients fare after the FMR, we present several
of our earnings measures by various characteristics.17 We ran regressions similar to
Eq. (1) for each group. The full set of outcomes and characteristics are available
upon request.








Total 100.0 2,124,835 100.0 100.0 5.7
CDR diary type
MIE 18.9 400,820 18.5 24.8 7.5
MIP 71.8 1,526,419 71.9 70.4 5.6
MINE 9.3 197,596 9.6 4.9 3.0
CDR release type
Direct release 81.5 1,731,979 81.2 86.1 6.0
Mailer 18.5 392,856 18.8 13.9 4.3
CDR profile score
Low 15.1 320,933 15.5 8.6 3.3
Medium 32.7 693,830 33.3 21.4 3.7
High 52.2 1,110,072 51.2 70.0 7.7
Year of initial FMR decision
1998 18.2 386,742 18.3 16.6 5.2
1999 12.5 264,635 12.5 11.9 5.5
2000 15.8 336,061 15.9 13.8 5.0
2001 14.6 311,139 14.9 11.1 4.3
2002 11.4 241,280 11.3 12.1 6.1
2003 6.2 132,684 6.1 8.1 7.5
2004 6.4 136,917 6.3 8.2 7.3
2005 6.6 140,282 6.5 8.3 7.2
2006 3.5 74,509 3.4 4.8 7.8
2007 2.6 55,905 2.6 3.1 6.7
2008 2.1 44,681 2.1 2.0 5.5
N 2,124,835 2,003,363 121,472
Source: Authors’ calculations using Social Security administrative records
CDR continuing disability review, FMR full medical review, MINE medical improvement not expected, MIP medical
improvement possible, MIE medical improvement expected, DI disability insurance. See text for full descriptions of
the sample
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The impact of cessation on mean earnings is fairly constant in absolute terms
across age groups (Fig. 3). However, former beneficiaries with neoplasms tend to
earn the most (about $16,000 per year) while those with schizophrenia and other
psychotic disorders and intellectual disabilities have the lowest post-FMR earnings.
The impact of cessation on earnings (and the proportion of former beneficiaries
with earnings) is highest in magnitude for individuals with neoplasms or a disease
of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue (Fig. 4). Nearly 90 % of ceased
beneficiaries aged 18 to 30 have post-FMR earnings, though this percentage de-
clines with age to below 60 % for individuals aged 50 to 59. Those with schizo-
phrenia and other psychotic disorders or an intellectual disability show the smallest
relative impact of cessation on having earnings, due to a higher proportion of con-
tinued beneficiaries having earnings. The proportion of former beneficiaries with
earnings in all follow-up years is notably lower and generally about half of the pro-
portion with earnings in any year (Fig. 5).
Fig. 2 Predicted earnings and proportion with earnings of DI workers before DI and after FMR. Source: Authors'
calculations using Social Security administrative records. Notes: Data are adjusted by the Consumer Price
Index-Urban (2012=100). Includes full medical reviews (FMR) from years from 1998 through 2008. See text for
full descriptions of the sample. Predicted values control for: pre-eligibility earnings quartile, release type, diary
type, profile score level, age at CDR, time on program, primary impairment, race, sex, program title, adjudicative
level of original program entry, whether there were prior CDRs, whether a consultative exam (CE) was
requested during the FMR, state of residence, and year of initial CDR. Estimates include years with $0 earnings
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Thus far, we have looked at the overall earnings experiences of those who undergo a
FMR and the experiences of selected demographic groups. An important question,
however, is what the outcomes might look like if SSA were to increase the number of
FMRs it conducts. For simplicity, consider a situation where SSA receives additional
funding for CDRs but does not fundamentally alter the selection process or CDR
rules—i.e., SSA simply conducts more FMRs with the same system of triage.
One way to consider what would happen is to assume that SSA would conduct more
FMRs on beneficiaries further down the scale of cessation likelihood. That is, more
MIPs and MINEs would receive FMRs, as would more people with medium or low
CDR profile scores. If we assume the individuals in these groups would be moved into
the FMR pool, and assume no substantial changes in the composition of these groups,
our observed outcomes for these groups can be viewed as a good proxy for what may
be expected. This would be an upper bound, since those not currently receiving an
FMR in these groups would likely be in poorer health. Additionally, more individuals
who received mailers would instead be directly released for an FMR. To the extent that
those shifted into the direct release pool would be individuals who would have only re-
ceived a mailer otherwise, outcomes would likely move toward those of the current
mailer group.
For each of these groups, we see poorer post-FMR outcomes relative to those groups
already most likely to receive a FMR (Table 4). Individuals who received mailers have
Table 3 Predicted 5-year average earnings of DI workers before and after FMR
Continued Ceased Impact (β)d
Mean pre-eligibility earnings ($)a 19,518 19,331 −188
Mean post-FMR earnings ($)a 1477 12,819 11,342
Ratio (2/1) 0.1 0.7
Any post-FMR earnings (%) 26.7 69.6 42.9
In all follow-up years 7.6 36.7 29.1
Percent with post-FMR earnings at or above
Pre-eligibility earningsb 9.9 48.3 38.4
In all follow-up years 2.8 17.0 14.2
Potential benefitb c 7.9 52.6 44.8
In all follow-up yearsc 1.2 19.8 18.6
SGAb 6.9 51.5 44.6
In all follow-up years 1.1 19.6 18.5
Povertyb 7.4 52.2 44.8
In all follow-up years 1.1 20.1 18.9
Full-time minimum wageb 6.0 49.1 43.1
In all follow-up years 0.9 18.0 17.1
N 2,124,835
Source: Authors’ calculations using Social Security administrative records
Data are adjusted by the Consumer Price Index-Urban (2012 = 100). See Fig. 2 for list of control variables
aEarnings are based on up to 5 years before DI eligibility and 5 years after the final FMR decision. If an individual had
fewer than 5 years of earnings in the respective period, then the mean is taken from however many years are available.
Estimates include years with $0 earnings
bIndicates if any year of earnings in the (up to) 5 years after the FMR (not including the year of the final decision) is
greater than or equal to the annualized threshold
c118,195 do not have PIA and are not included in the benefit estimates
dAll estimates are significant at the <1 % level
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lower earnings, are less likely to have any earnings, and less likely to have earnings
above our earnings thresholds than those directly released for a FMR. Similarly,
those with MINE or MIP diaries have worse labor market outcomes than those
with MIE diaries, and those with low or medium profile scores perform worse than
those with high profile scores in the labor market. The composition of these
groups, particularly with respect to impairments, would likely change if SSA in-
creased the number of CDRs in any given year as well as in the future as increased
CDRs remove individuals from certain impairment groups from the beneficiary
population and thus future years’ CDR pool. Because we do not observe the full
population eligible for a CDR, we cannot surmise exactly how such a shift would
affect these results.
An alternative way to estimate the earnings outcomes of ceased beneficiaries under a
policy of conducting additional CDRs is to compare outcomes across time periods
when SSA had different levels of funding (Fig. 1). As the resources, staff, and funding
available for FMRs varied over the study period, the post-FMR earnings outcomes have
likely also varied. However, estimates on earnings outcomes are likely correlated with
the overall economy and recent cohorts are likely substantially affected by the Great
Recession. Without a way to differentiate between the effect of resources and the
Fig. 3 Predicted post-FMR earnings of DI workers. Source: Authors' calculations using Social Security
administrative records. Notes: Data are adjusted by the Consumer Price Index-Urban (2012=100). Includes full
medical reviews (FMR) from years from 1998 through 2008. See text for full descriptions of the sample.
Earnings are based on up to five years before DI eligibility and five years after the final FMR decision. If an
individual had fewer than five years of earnings in the respective period, then the mean is taken from
however many years are available. See Fig. 2 for list of control variables. All estimates are significant at
the <1% level
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economy, we are unable to project any reasonable estimates of the pure effect of in-
creased resources dedicated to CDRs.18
6 Discussion and conclusions
This paper presents estimated labor market outcomes for individuals ceased from dis-
ability program participation after FMRs and offers a glimpse of what might be ex-
pected if SSA increased the number of CDRs it conducts. Since our estimates are
based on a specific segment of the CDR population, we caution the reader against
drawing broad conclusions about implications for the entire CDR population. The
majority of ceased beneficiaries have some earnings in the 5 years after a FMR cessa-
tion. If the Bound methodology holds, then the upper bound of potential effect on
earnings for those on the exit margin is high—about 43 percentage points. However,
earnings for ceased beneficiaries are generally low—average earnings for ceased DI
workers are about $13,000, compared to a national average of about $44,000. About
half earn at least as much as our definitions of their potential benefit, SGA, poverty,
and the full-time minimum wage levels, but few maintain these levels of earnings for
the entire follow-up period.
Fig. 4 Predicted proportion of DI workers with any post-FMR earnings by FMR outcome. Source: Authors'
calculations using Social Security administrative records. Indicates if any year of earnings in the (up to) five
years after the FMR (not including the year of the final decision) is greater than or equal to the annualized
threshold. See Fig. 2 for list of control variables. All estimates are significant at the < 1 % level
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Bound’s (1989) original study reported much lower employment for rejected male ap-
plicants in the 1970s (40–45 %) compared to our estimate for former beneficiaries
(70 %).19 von Wachter et al. (2011) also find much smaller potential impacts than we
find. Recent research has used variation in the disability determination process to esti-
mate the impacts of DI on employment for various groups. For example, Maestas et al.
(2013) were able to identify applicants on the entry margin of the program and pre-
dicted a 28 percentage point higher employment rate for that group if they had not re-
ceived benefits. French and Song (2014) also find much smaller effects. While our data
do not allow such an analysis, it is one potential area of future research, given the med-
ical CDR process follows the initial decision process. Even considering varying method-
ologies, the differences between the entry and exit margins appear large and especially
important as SSA increases its program integrity activity.
Our population is generally defined as those that SSA determined, a priori, to have a
high likelihood of cessation because their impairments may no longer preclude SGA-
level work. From that perspective, an upper bound of the impact of program exit on
earnings of 40 to 50 percentage points could be viewed as small. Expanding program in-
tegrity operations (such as CDRs) may result in a lower a priori likelihood-of-cessation
threshold used to target CDRs—more individuals that are less likely to be ceased would
receive CDRs—leading to a higher rate of program return and lower average levels of
work (measured by average earnings or earnings above the threshold measured in this
Fig. 5 Predicted proportion of DI workers with post-FMR earnings in all years by FMR outcome. Source: Authors'
calculations using Social Security administrative records. Indicates if earnings in the (up to) five years after the FMR
(not including the year of the final decision) are greater than or equal to the annualized threshold in every year.
See Fig. 2 for list of control variables. All estimates are significant at the <1% level
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paper) among those ceased. Previous work (Hemmeter and Stegman 2013) has found
that about 20 % of former DI workers return to the program within 8 years. However,
if SSA’s CDR operations are currently underfunded, there may be a backlog of individuals
who have medically improved but have not received a CDR in recent years. If these individ-
uals are similar to those currently ceased, we could see somewhat similar outcomes with in-
creased funding (at least until the backlog is eliminated).20
Increased program integrity, while appropriate for Social Security from a fiduciary
perspective, may also increase the number of people requiring other supports. Overall,
our findings imply that a substantial percentage of former beneficiaries are able to re-
enter the labor force after their benefits cease; however, a not-inconsequential minority
of those with earnings do not meet common thresholds of earnings sufficiency and are
not able to maintain their earnings over time. Additionally, almost one quarter of
former beneficiaries have no earnings after cessation, and few ceased individuals main-
tain employment above our measured earnings thresholds for the entire follow-up
period. Given the high probability of return and the generally poor labor market out-
comes of many ceased beneficiaries, analyses of the relationship between SSA’s CDR
policy and the broader social safety net may be in order. Others have shown that spou-
sal employment, other government programs, and asset spend-down are ways some in-
dividuals cope with waiting for a DI award (Coe et al. 2014, Lindner 2013, Bound et al.
2003). Whether these sources of support are available after program cessation is un-
known. Similarly, access to and use of health insurance has changed substantially in re-
cent years. This may have improved individuals’ health, resulting in an increased ability





















11,664 43.6 39.4 45.8 45.6 45.9 44.1
Mailer 9303 37.7 31.5 38.1 37.9 38.1 36.5
CDR diary type
MIE 13,304 45.8 40.8 48.0 47.9 48.2 46.5
MIP 10,811 42.1 38.0 44.1 43.9 44.1 42.3
MINE 8512 35.1 29.7 35.9 35.6 35.9 34.5
CDR profile score level
Low 8620 36.9 29.7 35.8 35.6 35.7 34.1
Medium 9732 41.8 34.5 41.1 40.6 40.8 38.9
High 12,171 43.9 40.6 46.9 46.9 47.1 45.4
Source: Authors’ calculations using Social Security administrative records.
Note: Data are adjusted by the Consumer Price Index-Urban (2012 = 100). Includes full medical reviews (FMR) from years
from 1998 through 2008. See Table 3 for list of controls. All estimates are significant at the < 1 % level
aEarnings are based on up to 5 years before SSI or DI eligibility and 5 years after the final FMR decision. If an individual
had fewer than 5 years of earnings in the respective period, then the mean is taken from however many years are
available. Estimates include years with $0 earnings.
bIndicates if any year of earnings in the (up to) 5 years after the FMR (not including the year of the final decision) is
greater than or equal to the annualized threshold
c118,195 do not have PIA and are not included in the benefit estimates
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to work or willingness to work, and the impact of the Affordable Care Act on the em-
ployment of former beneficiaries is an important area for future research.
Because the eligibility thresholds for SSA’s disability programs are strict, many of the
individuals we study likely still have significant disabilities; our results do not provide
any evidence on the broader health of these individuals. In exploratory analyses, we
found that 53 % of ceased former beneficiaries who returned to the programs did so
with a primary impairment in the same impairment category. Whether this is attribut-
able to a new complication for the same body system (such as an original impairment
of chronic bronchitis and a new impairment of emphysema both recorded as a respira-
tory impairment) or a relapse of the original condition (such as a recurrence of cancer)
is not readily identifiable in our data. Additionally, any change in diagnosis upon return
may not represent a new impairment since some secondary or unrecorded impairments
may have become more expressed. That is, the condition was always present but was
not reflected as the “primary” impairment in SSA records. Regardless, further research
is needed to understand the health dynamics of ceased beneficiaries.
When SSA expanded CDRs in the early 1980s, there were many allegations of SSA
terminating benefits for individuals with severe impairments that may not have im-
proved or for individuals who had been receiving benefits for a long period, which
“raise[d] questions about how and why these people [were] being terminated, and the
fairness of SSA’s decisions” (p. 5, Ahart 1982). This led to a moratorium on CDRs and
eventually led to the medical improvement review standard and other long-lasting pro-
gram rules (Government Accounting Office, 1986). Additionally, about two thirds of
those whose benefits SSA terminated in the early 1980s expansion eventually returned
to the program (Government Accounting Office, 1989). If SSA plans to expand CDRs
again, it is important to do so in a manner that is both legal and equitable. This paper
highlights one area for tracking the well-being of ceased beneficiaries—earnings; prior work
(Hemmeter and Stegman 2013) suggests another—program return. Keeping track of these
outcomes could alleviate public concerns about CDR policy.
For current beneficiaries, the fear of losing benefits may dampen any incentives
to return to work. Although individuals can appeal a FMR cessation and may re-
turn to the program, a determination that these individuals no longer have a
work-limiting disability may provide a greater incentive to attempt returning to
work. Our results, and those of Hemmeter and Stegman (2013) and Hemmeter
and Gilby (2009), suggest one additional potential area for research: whether sup-
ports are necessary, and if so which ones, to help individuals ceased because of a
FMR return to work. Identifying these supports could lead to longer-term finan-
cial savings for SSA and achieve societal goals of self-sufficiency for individuals
with disabilities.
Endnotes
1Yearly awards for Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) worker benefits have
more than doubled since the 1980s. The peak year of awards was 2010 with 1,026,988
DI worker awards. (Social Security Administration 2013b)
2Maestas and Song (2011) and Maestas and Yin (2008) examined the employment
effects of DI in the context of conversion to the Old Age and Survivors Insurance
(retirement) part of Social Security. Their exit margin is substantially different in that
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there is no expectation of medical improvement and less societal pressure to work. It
also represents a pure income effect compared to what we analyze, which is the overall
effect of the DI program.
3The DI program also provides benefits to children and spouses of worker beneficiar-
ies under certain conditions. We do not include these beneficiaries, or their eligibility
criteria, in our discussion and analysis.
4While much attention has been paid to the DI program, relatively little attention is
given to the SSI program. This is unfortunate as the two should not be, but often are,
conflated (Berkowitz and DeWitt 2013). Since both programs share a common defin-
ition of disability and administrative processes, changes or calls for increased scrutiny
of one often affect the other.
5This section and the following largely draw from the study by Hemmeter and
Stegman (2013).
6In FY 2008, the last year of our study population, about 90 % of initial decisions for
DI workers were continuations. In the same year, 59 % of initial cessations for DI
workers were appealed to the reconsideration level, with 70 % of those overturned.
Additionally, about 79 % of DI workers with a cessation at the reconsideration level
appealed in FY 2008; 49 % were successful. (SSA 2013a)
7Diary dates for MIE cases are set for between 18 months and 3 years; MIP diaries
are set for 3 years; MINE diaries are set for 7 years.
8About 9 % of DI workers died during the 5-year follow-up period. In analyses not
reported in the text, we limited the target population to those who survived the follow-
up period; the results were very similar to those presented here.
9Most legal earnings are now subject to the Social Security tax. Additionally, we ex-
pect few beneficiaries in our study to earn over the taxable maximum. In some cases,
the earnings on an individual’s record may reflect delayed earnings from prior work ra-
ther than for current work.
10Treitel (1979) also used a 5-year average of earnings.
11We set earnings after death to missing. The results are very similar when we set
earnings after age 62 (early retirement) or subsequent SSI or DI participation to
“missing” to reduce the effect of future program participation.
12The loss of benefits may be seen by some as a loss of the potential support neces-
sary to work. For example, there may be some individuals working below SGA using
their benefits for car payments and other expenses necessary for work. This could, in
theory, lead to a narrower earnings gap (or even a negative gap) between the ceased
and continued individuals. However, the loss of benefits in this case would result in
less work. Thus, our estimate of the earnings and employment levels of ceased benefi-
ciaries would still be an upper bound, but the difference between the ceased and con-
tinued individuals would be biased. Because work by non-ceased individuals in our
target population is uncommon, we do not think this substantially alters our
hypotheses.
13Covariates include pre-eligibility earnings quartile, release type, diary type, profile
score level, age at CDR, time on program, primary impairment, race, sex, whether con-
currently receiving SSI and DI, adjudicative level of original program entry, whether
there were prior CDRs, whether a consultative examination was requested during the
FMR, state of residence, and year of initial CDR.
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14We do not adjust the DI benefit amount by worker’s compensation because in some
states, DI is offset by worker’s compensation and in other states, worker’s compensation is
offset by DI. We also do not adjust for automatic deductions for Medicare; doing so as-
sumes similar deductions for health insurance in the labor market, which may not be real-
istic. The results are very similar when we subtract Medicare Part B premiums from the
potential benefit (in 2013 the monthly premium for Part B was $104.90). The availability
of similarly-valued (both in terms of objective price and subjective utility) may affect the
types of employment our study population, who may still have high health costs, seeks or
is able to find. We thank an anonymous referee for identifying this issue.
15These annualized thresholds generally follow the same path. However, we note that
the minimum wage measure is above the SGA and poverty thresholds in all years. Up
until the early 2000s, SSA changed the SGA level sporadically, resulting in periods of
declining real value. Similarly, the Federal minimum wage changes sporadically, losing
real value for several years at a time. The poverty threshold has regularly been adjusted
for the cost of living since its inception. In 2012, the last year of earnings data in our
analysis, annualized SGA was $12,120; the poverty threshold was $11,170; the full-time
Federal minimum wage was $15,080; and the potential FBR was $8,376.
16In addition to the exclusions listed in the text, we also exclude the profile sample
from our analyses due to the changing nature of the profile sample over time and be-
cause our intent is to present the outcomes for individuals who go through the “usual”
CDR process, not the process used to validate the CDR process.
17How the local economic environment affects outcomes likely plays an important
factor in the re-entry of these individuals into the labor force. Unfortunately, we are un-
able to determine where individuals live after the year of the FMR. While many likely
remain in the same area, there is no good source of information on former beneficiary
migration.
18Simple bivariate regressions between the funding level (in millions) for a fiscal year
and the percent of that calendar year’s ceased beneficiaries with earnings above the
various thresholds in any year surprisingly yield significantly positive, although tiny, co-
efficients. However, we note that this very simple analysis does not control for other
factors, including fluctuating economic conditions.
19Our estimated impacts for males and females are not substantially different.
20The Congressional Budget Office (2011) estimates a marginal return on investment
of only about $3 for every $1 SSA spends on CDRs above current expenditures, which
is consistent with the expectation that additional CDRs will result in fewer people
remaining off the program (and SSI, Medicare, or Medicaid).
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